Abstract. An established trend in software engineering insists on using components (sometimes also called services or packages) to encapsulate a set of related functionalities or data. By defining interfaces specifying what functionalities they provide or use, components can be combined with others to form more complex components. In this way, IT systems can be designed by mostly re-using existing components and developing new ones to provide new functionalities. In this paper, we introduce a notion of component and a combination mechanism for an important class of software artifacts, called security-sensitive workflows. These are business processes in which execution constraints on the tasks are complemented with authorization constraints (e.g., Separation of Duty) and authorization policies (constraining which users can execute which tasks). We show how well-known workflow execution patterns can be simulated by our combination mechanism and how authorization constraints can also be imposed across components. Then, we demonstrate the usefulness of our notion of component by showing (i) the scalability of a technique for the synthesis of run-time monitors for security-sensitive workflows and (ii) the design of a plug-in for the re-use of workflows and related run-time monitors inside an editor for security-sensitive workflows.
Introduction
Nowadays, business processes constantly strive to adapt to rapidly evolving markets under continuous pressure of regulatory and technological changes. In this respect, the most frequent problem faced by companies is the lack of automation when trying to incorporate new business requirements into existing processes. A traditional approach to business process modeling frequently results in large models that are difficult to change and maintain. This makes it critical that business process models be modular and flexible, not only for increased modeling agility at design-time but also for greater robustness and flexibility of enacting processes at run-time (see, e.g., [11] for a discussion about this and related problems).
The situation is further complicated when considering the class of securitysensitive workflows [1] , i.e. when tasks in processes are executed under the responsibility of humans or software agents acting on their behalf. This means that, besides the usual execution constraints (specified by causal relations among tasks), security-sensitive workflows add authorization policies and constraints, i.e. under which conditions users can execute tasks. Authorization policies are usually specified by using some variant of the Role Based Access Control (RBAC) model, see, e.g., [20] , while authorization constraints restrict which users can execute some set of tasks in a given workflow instance; an example is the Separation of Duties (SoD) constraint requiring two tasks to be executed by distinct users. Since authorization policies and constraints may prevent the successful termination of the workflow (i.e. not all tasks can be executed), it is crucial to be able to solve at design-time, the Workflow Satisfiability Problem (WSP) [5] , i.e. establishing if all tasks in the workflow can be executed satisfying the authorization policy without violating any authorization constraint, and at run-time, a variant of the WSP requiring the synthesis of a monitor capable of granting the request of a user to execute a task if this does not prevent the successful termination of the workflow instance (see, e.g., [2, 3] ). The combination of the need for modularity and flexibility with that for developing efficient techniques to solve the WSP and its run-time variant gives rise to new fundamental questions, such as Q1: how can we specify security-sensitive workflow components, i.e. business processes equipped with interfaces defining their inputs and outputs together with their dependencies (a component declares the services it provides and those that it depends upon)? Q2: how can we "glue together" components into a more complex one that can again be combined with others if necessary? Q3: how can we solve the WSP and synthesize run-time monitors for securitysensitive workflow components that can be modularly re-used to solve the WSP and synthesize a run-time monitor for their combination?
In this paper, we provide answers to the three questions above by making the following contributions:
A1: we introduce the notion of security-sensitive workflow component (Section 2) as a symbolic transition system extended with a suitable notion of interface, A2: we define how components can be "glued together" (Section 3) by specifying how execution and authorization constraints of components become related, A3: we describe how run-time monitors solving the WSP of security-sensitive workflow components can be modularly reused (Section 4) to build one solving the WSP of their combination. monitors to scale up, by using A3. Second, we sketch the architecture of a tool for the creation of security-sensitive workflows which maintains a library of components together with their run-time monitors. This holds the promise to help workflow designers in their quest for adapting processes to rapidly evolving requirements.
Security-sensitive Workflow Components
We introduce a refinement of the notion of symbolic transition system in [3] which, associated to a suitable notion of interface, constitutes a (symbolic) securitysensitive component. We motivate the utility of this notion by means of an example.
Example 1. Figure 1 shows two workflows in BPM Notation (BPMN) [13] . Each workflow contains two circles, the one on the left represents the start event (triggering the execution of the workflow), whereas that on the right the end event (terminating the execution of the workflow), tasks are depicted by labeled boxes, the constraints on the execution of tasks are shown as solid arrows (for sequence flows) and diamonds labeled by + (for parallel flows), the fact that a task must be executed under the responsibility of a user is indicated by the man icon inside a box, and the SoD constraints as dashed lines labeled by =.
The workflow on the left is the Trip Request Workflow (TRW) whose goal is that of requesting trips for employees in an organization. It is composed of five tasks: Request (t1), Car rental (t2), Hotel booking (t3), Flight reservation (t4), and Validation (t5). Five Separation of Duty (SoD) constraints must be enforced, i.e. the tasks in the pairs (t1, t2), (t1, t4), (t2, t3), (t2, t5), and (t3, t5) must be executed by distinct users in any sequence of task executions of the TRW.
The workflow on the right is the Moderate Discussion Workflow (MDW) whose goal is to organize a discussion and voting process in an organization. It is composed of four tasks: Request (t1), Moderate Conference Call (t7), Moderate email Discussion (t7), and Validation (t5). Four SoD constraints must be enforced: (t1, t6), (t6, t5), (t6, t7), and (t7, t5).
In both workflows, each task is executed under the responsibility of a user who has the right to execute it according to some authorization policy, which-for the sake of brevity-we leave unspecified.
Notice that tasks t1 and t5 in Figure 1 are the same in both TRW and MDW. The goal of this paper is to develop a notion of security-sensitive component such that tasks t1 and t5 can be modularly reused in the specifications of both workflows so that only the specification of the parallel execution of tasks t2, t3, and t4 for the TRW and t6 and t7 for the MDW must be developed from scratch in the two cases. Additionally, we want that run-time monitors for the various components can also be modularly reused.
Indeed, the simplicity of the TRW and MDW spoils the advantages of a modular approach; the small dimension of the workflows allows us to keep the paper to a reasonable size. However, for large workflows-as we will see below in Section 4-the advantages are substantial. To give an intuition of this, imagine to replace the tasks reused in both workflows, i.e. t1 and t5, with complex workflows: reusing their specifications and being able to synthesize run-time monitors for them, that can be used for larger workflows in which they are plugged, becomes much more interesting.
A (symbolic) security-sensitive component is a pair (S, Int) where S is a (symbolic) security-sensitive transition system and Int is its interface. Security-sensitive transition system. Since the semantics of BPMN can be given by means of (extensions of) Petri nets (see, e.g., [19] ) and the latter can be represented as symbolic state transition systems (see, e.g., [16] ), S is the symbolic transition system that can be associated to security sensitive workflows specified in BPMN as those in Figure 1 . A (symbolic) security-sensitive transition system S is a tuple of the form ((P, D, A, H, C), Tr , B) where P ∪ D ∪ A ∪ H ∪ C are the state variables, Tr is a set of transitions, and B is a set of constraints on the state variables in C. The finite set P contains Boolean variables representing the places of the Petri net associated to a BPMN specification of the security-sensitive workflow and D is a finite set of Boolean variables representing the fact that a task has been executed or not; P ∪ D are called execution constraint variables. The finite set A contains interface predicates to the authorization policy, H is a set of predicates recording which users have executed which tasks, and C is a set of interface predicates to the authorization constraints; A ∪ H ∪ C are called authorization constraint variables. The set Tr contains the transitions (or events) of the form
where t is the name of a task taken from a finite set, u is a variable ranging over a set U of users, en EC (P, D) is a predicate on P ∪D (called the enabling condition for the execution constraint), en Auth (A, C) is a predicate on {v(u)|v ∈ A ∪ C} (called the enabling condition for the authorization constraint), act EC (P, D) contains parallel assignments of the form v := b where v ∈ P ∪ D and b is a Boolean value (called the update of the execution constraint of the security sensitive workflow), and act Auth (H) contains parallel assignments of the form v(u) := b where v ∈ H and b is a Boolean value (called the update of the authorization history of the security sensitive workflow). 1 Finally, the finite set B contains always constraints of the form
where u is a variable ranging over users, v is a variable in C, and hst is a Boolean combination of atoms of the form w(u) with w ∈ H.
Interface of a security-sensitive component. 
and C i are all empty, the component (S, Int) can only be interfaced with an authorization policy via the interface variables in A. The state variables in D are only used internally, to indicate that a task has been or has not been executed; thus, none of them is exposed in the interface Int. The variables in P , H, and C are local to S but some of them can be exposed in the interface in order to enable the combination of S with other components in a way which will be described below (Section 3). The super-scripts i and o stand for input and output, respectively. The requirement that variables in P i are not assigned the value T (rue) by any transition of the component allows their values to be determined by those in another component. Dually, the requirement that variables in P o can only be assigned the value T (rue) by any transition of the component allows them to determine the values of variables in another component. Similarly to the values of the variables in P i , those of the variables in C i are fixed when combining the module with another; this is the reason for which only the variables in C \ C i can occur in the always constraints of the component.
Example 2. We now illustrate the notion of security-sensitive component by considering the workflows in Figure 1 . As said in Example 1, we want to reuse tasks t1 and t5 in both TRW and MDW. For this, we split the specification of each workflow in four components C 1 , C 234 , C 67 , and C 5 as shown in Figure 2 , where the sequential composition of C 1 , C 234 , and C 5 yields TRW and that of C 1 , C 67 , and C 5 gives MDW. The figure shows the extended Petri nets representing the four components and how they are connected: circles represent places, rectangles with a man icon transitions to be executed under the responsibility of users, rectangles without the icon transitions not needing human intervention, (black) dashed lines represent SoD constraints between tasks belonging to the same component, (gray) dashed lines SoD constraints between tasks belonging to distinct components, (black) solid arrows the control flow in the same component, and (gray) dashed arrows the control flow between two components. Note that the control flow between two components is outside of the semantics of extended Petri nets. For example, a token in place p0 of C 1 goes to p1 of C 1 after the execution of t1 and, at the same time a token is put in place p1 of C 234 because of the (gray) dashed arrow from p1 in C 1 to p0 in C 234 representing an inter execution constraint. When the token is in p0, the system executes the split transition s in C 234 that removes the token from p0 and puts one in p1, p2, and p3 so that t2, t3, and t4 in C 234 become enabled. Notice that the execution of t2 is constrained by a SoD constraint from task t1 in component C 1 (dashed arrow between t1 in C 1 and t2 in C 234 ): this means that the user who has executed t1 in C 1 cannot execute also t2 in C 234 .
We now show how to formalize the components depicted in Figure 2 by defining for y = 1, 5, and take
According to the transition in Tr 1 , task t1 is enabled when there is a token in place p0 1 (place p0 of component C 1 in Figure 2 ), t1 has not been already executed (¬d t1 ) and there exists a user u capable of executing t1 (a t1 (u)). The effect of executing such a transition is to move the token from p0 1 to p1 1 (places p0 and p1 of component C 1 in Figure 2 , respectively), set d t1 to true meaning that t1 has been executed, and recording that t1 has been executed by u. The interface of each component is the following: p0 y is the input place, p1 y is the output place, and the history variable h ty can be used to constrain the execution of tasks in other components (for instance of t2 in the TRW as t1 and t2 are involved in a SoD, shown by the gray dashed line between the two tasks in Figure 2 ). Notice that the execution of task t1 cannot be constrained by the execution of tasks in other components (thus C 
Transitions s 234 and j 234 (corresponding to the rectangles labeled s and j of component C 234 in Figure 2 ) model the parallel composition of tasks t2, t3, and t4 in TRW and MDW (cf. the parallel flows depicted as diamonds labeled with + in Figure 1 ). Since no human intervention is needed, the enabling conditions for the authorization constraint of both transitions are omitted. Tasks t2 and t3 are involved in a SoD constraint (cf. the dashed lines labeled by = between t2 and t3 in Figure 2 ). For this reason, their enabling conditions contain c t2 (u) and c t3 (u) which are defined in B 234 so as to prevent the execution of t2 and t3 by the same users: to execute t3 (t2, resp.), user u must be such that ¬h t2 (u) (¬h t3 (u), resp.), i.e. u should have not executed t2 (t3, resp.). Transitions t2, t3, and t4 in Tr 234 have enabling conditions that contain c i t2 (u), c i t3 (u), and c i t4 (u) which will be defined so as to satisfy the SoD constraints in which the tasks are involved (cf. the gray dashed lines across the rectangles in Figure 2 ). The definition of component C 67 is quite similar (albeit simpler) to that of C 234 : P 67 := {py 67 |y = 0, ..., 5} D 67 := {s 67 , j 67 , d ty |y = 6, 7} A 67 := {a ty |y = 6, 7} H 67 := {h ty |y = 6, 7} C 67 := {c ty , c i ty |y = 6, 7}
Section 3 below explains how components C 1 , C 234 , C 67 , and C 5 can be "glued together" to build TRW and MDW.
Semantics of a security-sensitive component. The notion of symbolic security-sensitive transition system introduced here is equivalent to that in [3] ; the only difference being the presence of the authorization constraint variables in C together with the always constraints in B. It is easy to see that, given a transition system ((P, D, A, H, C), Tr , B), it is always possible to eliminate the variables in C occurring in B from the conditions of transitions in Tr by using (2): it is sufficient to replace each occurrence of v(u) with hst. Let [[tr ]] B denote the transition obtained from tr by exhaustively replacing the variables in C that also occur in B as explained above. Since no variable in C may occur in the update of a transition and in the enabling condition for the execution constraint of a transition, by abuse of notation, we apply the operator [[·]] B to the enabling condition for the authorization constraint of tr . The substitution process eventually terminates since in hst there is no occurrence of variables in the finite set C, only the variables in H may occur. The possibility of eliminating the variables in C allows us to give the semantics of the class of (symbolic) security-sensitive transition systems considered here by using the notion of weakest liberal precondition (wlp) [7] as done in [3] . The intuition is that computing a wlp with respect to the transitions in Tr and the always constraints in B is equivalent to computing that with respect to [[Tr ] ] B . Formally, we define
where B is a set of always constraints, tr is of the form (1), K is a predicate over −→ K n where K i is a predicate over P ∪ D ∪ A ∪ C and tr i is a symbolic transition such that K i is logically equivalent to wlp(tr i , B, K i+1 ) for i = 0, ..., n − 1. The semantics of the security-sensitive transition system S is the set of all possible symbolic behaviors. The semantics of a security-sensitive component (S, Int) is the set of all possible symbolic behaviors of the security-sensitive transition system S. 
has not yet been executed, and user u has the right to execute t1 and authorization constraints imposed by other components are satisfied (e.g., the SoD constraint between t5 and t2 in C 234 for the TRW).
Gluing together Security-Sensitive Components
We now show how components can be combined together in order to build other, more complex, components. For l = 1, 2, let (S l , Int l ) be a symbolic securitysensitive component where Int l = (A, P for k, j = 1, 2 and k = j. Intuitively, the gluing assertions in G specify inter component constraints; those in G EC how the control flow is passed from one component to another whereas those in G Auth authorization constraints across components, i.e. how the fact that a task in a component is executed by a certain user constrains the execution of a task in another component by a sub-set of the users entitled to do so.
The symbolic security-sensitive component (S, Int) obtained by gluing (S 1 , Int 1 ) and (S 2 , Int 2 ) together with G, in symbols (S, Int) = (S 1 , Int 1 ) ⊕ G (S 2 , Int 2 ), is defined as S = ((P, D, A, H, C), Tr , B) and Int = (A,
, where o := b is among the parallel assignments of tr j ; otherwise, tr j is returned unchanged, for j, k = 1, 2 and j = k,
The definition is well formed since S is obviously a security-sensitive transition system and Int satisfies all the structural constraints at page 5. 
t1(u)
ensuring that when the token is put in p1 1 it is also put in p0 234 (in this way, we can specify how the control flow is transferred from C 1 to C 234 ); -its set of always constraints contains all the constraints in B 1 and B 234 plus those in G Auth so that the SoD constraints between task t1 in C 1 and tasks t2 and t4 in C 234 are added; -if its interface is (A, P i , P o , H o , C i ), then P i := {p1 1 } since p0 234 occurs in G EC , P 0 := {p7 234 } since p1 1 occurs in G EC , and C i := ∅ since both c i t2 and c i t4 occur in G Auth .
Notice that C 1 ⊕ G C 234 can be combined with C 5 so as to form a component corresponding to the TRW in Figure 1 . This is possible by considering the following set G = G EC ∪ G Auth of gluing assertions where G EC := {p7 234 ⇔ p0 5 } and G Auth := {∀u.c i t5 (u) ⇔ ¬h t2 (u) ∧ ¬h t3 (u)}. The inter execution constraint in G EC corresponds to the dashed arrow connecting p7 in component C 234 (p7 234 ) to p0 in component C 5 (p0 5 ) in Figure 2 . The always constraint in G Auth formalizes the dashed lines linking task t5 of C 5 with tasks t2 and t3 of C 234 .
We now illustrate the computation of the wlp with respect to the transitions of a composed component by means of an example. 
whose conjunction K characterizes the final states of TRW, i.e. those situations in which all tasks have been executed and there is just one token in place p1 5 (notice that K 234 does not mention p7 234 whose value is implied by K 5 and the inter execution constraints p7 234 ⇔ p0 5 and similarly K 1 does not mention p1 1 whose value is implied by K 234 and the inter execution constraint in p1 1 ⇔ p0 234 ). Now we compute wlp(t5, B, K) where B is the union of B 1 , B 234 , B 5 , G Auth , and G Auth given in Example 4 by using (3):
Notice how K 1 and K 234 have not been modified since the parallel updates of t5 do not mention any of the state variables in C 1 and C 234 but only those of C 5 , namely p0 5 and d t5 .
To illustrate how the computation of wlp takes into account the transfer of the control flow from one component to another, let us compute the wlp of (4) Notice the added assignment p0 5 := T to take into account the inter execution constraint in G EC (see Example 4) ensuring that when the token is put in p7 234 , it is also put in p0 5 . By using (3), we have that wlp(j * 234 , B, (4)) is
Notice how K 1 is left unmodified since it describes the state of component C 1 and no gluing assertions involve state variables of C 1 and those in the update of j * 234 , K 234 instead is modified substantially (see the predicate in square brackets) since j 234 is a transition of component C 234 , while the remaining part of (5) is almost identical to the formula between parentheses in (4) except for the deletion of p0 5 because of the additional assignment p0 5 := T in j * 234 , introduced to take into account the inter execution constraint in G Auth .
An alternative way of computing wlp(j with K 1 and the predicate obtained by deleting p0 5 from wlp(t5, B 5 ∪ G Auth , K 5 ) in which we delete p0 5 (because (4) implies that p0 5 is T ) thereby obtaining the predicate between parentheses in (4), we derive (5) as before.
The last paragraph of the example suggests a modular approach to computing wlp's. It is indeed possible to generalize the process described above and derive a modularity result for computing the wlp of a complex component by using the wlp's of its components by taking into account the gluing assertions. We do not do this here because it is not central to the applications of the notion of component discussed in Section 4 below. Theorem 1. Let (S k , Int k ) be a symbolic security-sensitive component for k = 1, 2, 3, G 1,2 be a set of gluing assertions over Int 1 and Int 2 , and G 2,3 be a set of gluing assertions over Int 2 and Int 3 . Then,
The proof is straightforward and based on the commutativity and associativity of set union. Notice that the associativity property above is expressed by taking into account the union of the gluing assertions over the interfaces of the reusable systems being combined.
Example 6. Recall the components of Example 4. Because of Theorem 1, we have that the TRW can be expressed as
Notice that, despite the commutativity of the operator ⊕, the task in C 1 will always be executed before all tasks in components C 234 and C 5 because of the gluing assertions in G . Thus, the component C 234 ⊕ G C 1 ⊕ G C 5 obtained by considering the components in a different order is equivalent to TRW. Appendix A shows how standard composition patterns available in the literature for workflows can be expressed by using the notion of components and the composition operator ⊕ introduced above.
Applications
We present two applications of security-sensitive components and their modular combination which are made possible by the same modularity result about the synthesis of run-time monitors for the WSP.
In [3] , we have shown how to automatically derive a monitor capable of solving the run-time version of the Workflow Satisfiability Problem (WSP) [5] of a security-sensitive transition system. As already discussed in the paragraph "Semantics of a security-sensitive component" in Section 2, the notion of security-sensitive transition system introduced here and that in [3] are equivalent. In particular, given a security-sensitive transition system ((P, D, A, H, C), Tr , B)
we can derive an equivalent security-sensitive transition system of the form ((P, D, A , H, ∅), {[[tr ]] B |tr ∈ B}, ∅), which is precisely a security-sensitive transition system of [3] , where A contains the variables in A and those in C which are not mentioned in B. Let RM be the procedure which takes as input a security-sensitive transition system S = ((P, D, A, H, C), Tr , B) , applies the transformation above, and then the procedure for the synthesis of run-time monitors described in [3] , which returns a Datalog [4] program RM(S) defining a predicate can do(u, t) such that user u can execute task t and the workflow can successfully terminate iff can do(u, t) is a logical consequence (in the sense of Datalog) of RM(S) ∪ P ∪ H (in symbols RM(S), P, H |= can do(u, t)), where P is a Datalog program defining the meaning of the predicates in A (i.e. the authorization policy) and H is a set of history facts of the form h t (u), recording the fact that user u has executed task t. We now show how to reuse RM for the modular construction of run-time monitors for the WSP, i.e. we build a monitor for a composite component by combining those for their constituent components. Let G = G EC ∪ G Auth be a set of gluing assertions where G EC is a set of inter execution constraints and G Auth a set of always constraints over an interface (A,
Intuitively, the shape of the Datalog clauses in G EC models how the execution flow is transferred from a component (that with an output place) to the other (that with an input place).
, H k is a set of (history) facts over H k , and P k a Datalog program (for the authorization policy) over A k , for k = 1, 2. If G is a set of gluing assertions over Int 1 and Int 2 , then RM(S), H 1 ,
The idea underlying the proof of this theorem is that the monitors for the components are computed by considering any possible values for the variables in their interfaces. The additional constraints in the gluing assertions simply consider a sub-set of all these values by specifying how the execution flow goes from one component to the other and how the authorization constraints across components further constrain the possible executions of a component depending on which users have executed certain tasks in the other.
As anticipated above, Theorem 2 paves the way to two applications which are discussed more in detail in the following. Scalability of the Synthesis of Run-Time Monitors. It is possible to decompose large workflows into smaller components by using pre-existing techniques (see, e.g., [14] ), generate monitors for each module and glue them, allowing us to solve the WSP for very large workflows, which would be otherwise intractable Fig. 3 . Time taken to synthesize a monitor varying with the number of tasks due to state space explosion as shown in [3] . The main obstacle to the monitor synthesis is the state space explosion caused by the need of computing all the possible interleavings of task executions and the execution of these tasks by the users. Theorem 2 allows for splitting a large security-sensitive workflow into smaller components, allowing one to synthesize the monitors for such components with smaller state spaces and then glue them together in order to build the monitor for the composed component.
To show the practical scalability of this approach, we have performed a set of experiments with the random workflow generator from [3] , which is capable of generating random security-sensitive workflows with an arbitrary number of tasks and composing them sequentially. For the experiments, we have generated components with a fixed size of 5 tasks and a varying number of constraints. The number of constraints is specified as a percentage (5%, 10% and 20%) of the number of tasks in each component for intra-component constraints and as a percentage of the total number of tasks for inter-component constraints. Thus, in the configurations 5% and 10% there are no intra-component constraints, while in the configuration 20% there is one for each component; for a workflow with 100 tasks, there are 5 inter-component constraints in the configuration 5%, 10 in the configuration 10% and 20 in the configuration 20%. The experiments have been conducted on a MacBook Air 2014 with a 1.3GHz dual-core Intel Core i5 processor and 8GB of RAM running MAC OS X 10.10.2. The results are shown in Figure 3 , in which the x-axis contains the total number of tasks in a workflow divided by 10 (the total number of components is the number in the x axis times 2) and the y-axis shows the total time in seconds taken by the monitor synthesis procedure RM of [3] . Each data point is taken as the average of running RM 5 times for each configuration. Figure 3 suggests a linear (instead of the expected exponential!) behavior with respect to the number of tasks on this set of synthetic benchmarks. A Tool for the Design and Reuse of Components and Monitors. Recent practices in business process management have emphasized the use of business Fig. 4 . Architecture of a business process design tool integrated with a repository of models and monitors process repositories [22] in order to promote process reuse and more quickly address the rapidly evolving requirements on business process. Theorem 2 supports not only the creation of repositories containing reusable business processes in the form of security-sensitive workflows but also associating with them run-time monitors that can be modularly combined to create more complex monitors for composed components. These are important features in the context of industrial applications of business processes, as they support reuse of existing technologies (editors and repositories of business processes) and augment them by monitor synthesis capabilities that make the synthesis automatic, scalable (as shown by the experiments above), and transparent to the final user (the procedure RM is fully automated). The Monitor Synthesizer component implements the procedure RM described above to compute (modular) monitors for workflow components and their composition modeled in the process composer. The Repository component represents a storage system for workflow models together with the monitor synthesized by the (modular) monitor synthesizer. Note that such repository may be part of the BPM solution (as in, e.g., IBM Business Process Manager) or remotely located (e.g., Apromore [15] ). The modeler interacts with the process composer with a request/response relation. The same relation exists between the process composer and the monitor synthesizer to request the synthesis of a run-time monitor for the BPMN model under specification. The process composer can store/retrieve BPMN models together with the synthesized monitors to/from the repository.
Example 7. Let us recall the situation in Example 2. The tool in Figure 4 allows us to re-use components C 1 and C 5 in both the specification of TRW and MDW as shown in Figure 2 . Additionally, the capability of storing automatically synthesized run-time monitors in the repository associated to the components permits their re-use in different business processes thanks to the modularity result in Theorem 2.
The business process modeling (process composer in Figure 4 ) and repository components in the proposed architecture are also part of common reference architectures, e.g., [21] . The monitor synthesizer and the extension of the repository to store monitors are unique contributions of this paper. Whenever a business modeler uses the process composer, he/she can import models with their associated monitors from the repository, combine the models with new or pre-existing models and export the resulting complex component back to the repository, storing the process together with its monitor. Notice that the monitor synthesis of the various components can be done, when necessary, while the editing is progressing, thereby optimizing the waiting time for the monitor.
So far, we have implemented the (modular) monitor synthesizer as a commandline tool and not yet integrated it with a modeling environment. We intend to do so using the extensible Signavio Core Components 6 editor and a repository structure like Apromore [15] , which is already integrated with the editor and supports BPMN 2.0 models for processes. The repository must be extended to store parametric Datalog monitors associated with BPMN. We believe that, since all the steps are automated, the graphical integration will provide a very simple to use, push-button approach for modelers to modularly and efficiently derive precise run-time monitors for business processes that can be later securely deployed.
Discussion
We have described and formalized a modular approach for the synthesis of run-time monitors for reusable security-sensitive workflows. We have shown the scalability of modular monitor synthesis by means of experiments. We have also discussed the initial implementation of a tool integrating an editor with a repository of business processes extended with the capability of storing associated run-time monitors so that the modular synthesis of monitors can be exploited in business re-use.
Reuse in Business Process Management has been an intense topic of research and industrial application; see, e.g., [8, 6] . Several works in the field of Petri net have investigated modularity; see, e.g., [12] . To the best of our knowledge, none of the works in these contexts addresses security issues as we do here. The most closely related work is [3] , which is extended here with the notion of modularity.
As future work, we intend to fully implement the architecture in Figure 4 by using available repositories, such as Apromore [15] . We also plan to perform extensive experiements concerning process reuse on the business processes available in the repositories. 
A Composition patterns
We show how the basic control patterns in workflow management (see, e.g., [17, 9] ) can be expressed by the gluing operator ⊕ introduced above. We consider sequential (when n processes are executed one after the other), parallel (when n processes are executed in parallel), and alternative composition (when only one out of n processes is executed). For lack of space, we do not consider other composition patterns (such as the hierarchical one, when a task is refined to a complex process) which can also be expressed in our approach by using a bit of ingenuity. To simplify the technical development below, we describe each composition pattern using two components (S 1 , Int 1 ) and (S 2 , Int 2 ); the generalization to n components is straightforward. Additionally, again for the sake of simplicity, assume that P there is just one input and just one output place in both components. (Notice that this assumption is satisfied when considering workflow nets-see, e.g., [18] -which are a particular class of Petri nets frequently used for modeling workflows.) Sequential composition. Let us consider the situation in which the process specified by component S 1 must be executed before the process executed by component S 2 . To model this with the gluing operator, it is sufficient to consider a set G = G EC ∪ G Auth of gluing assertions over Int 1 and Int 2 such that G EC = {p Int 1 ) will always be executed before that specified by (S 2 , Int 2 ) when considering their composition. Parallel composition. Let us consider the situation in which the processes specified by components S 1 and S 2 must be executed in parallel. To model this with the gluing operator, we need to preliminarily introduce two other components, each containing a single transition, one for splitting and one for joining the execution flow. Formally, we define C * = ((((P * , D * , ∅, ∅, ∅), Tr * , ∅), (∅, P i * , P o * , ∅, ∅)), Int * ) , P as = {p0 as , p1 as , p2 as }, D as = {d as }, P aj = {q0 aj , q1 aj , q2 aj }, D aj = {d aj }, Alternative composition. Similarly to parallel composition, we need to introduce also for this pattern two other components, each containing two nondeterministic transitions to route the execution flow in one of the two components (S 1 , Int 1 ) or (S 2 , Int 2 ) instead of both as above. Formally, we define C * = ((((P * , D * , ∅, ∅, ∅), Tr * , ∅), (∅, P i * , P o * , ∅, ∅)), Int * ) , P os = {p0 os , p1 os , p2 os }, D os = {d os }, P oj = {q0 oj , q1 oj , q2 oj }, D oj = {d oj }, 
